Monday, September 25, 2017

Why India Needs a Boost from Fiscal and Monetary Policies

Amid growing discontent about the economy--corroborated by my impressionistic view based on Twitterati, most of whom are favorably disposed to the Modi government--a few prominent economists have come out strongly against any short-term fiscal boost. Some have predictably called for more "reforms." Let me state categorically, no amount of reforms will kickstart the private sector quickly. Corporate debt loads are still high, capacity utilization low, and banks are hobbled by NPAs. Businesses invest when they swamped with demand and credit is easily available. Of course, reforms help speed up investment when businesses are eager to invest, but they are a distinctly secondary condition. The famous 1991 reforms started soon after I joined ICICI in 1991. There was no magical pickup in capex. The new project pipeline was practically dry for the next several months. Capex did not meaningfully pickup until 1993-94.

Reforms mantra at this juncture is like the expansionary fiscal consolidation snake oil that was sold during the early stages of the European sovereign debt crisis. The idea was that government austerity and spending cutback could somehow be miraculously lead to faster economic growth. If this sounds too good to be true, it is. Essentially, it ignored the simple math of balance sheet constraints. if European governments were going to consolidate, that is run surpluses and bring down their debt, elementary accounting would imply that some other sector(s)--households, firms, or the rest of the world--had to run a corresponding financial deficit. Given the high levels of private sector debt in many of the beleaguered European countries at that time (excessive household debt among other things had caused the European crisis) and a global economy in which every country was bent on increasing its trade surplus, expansionary fiscal consolidation was an oxymoron.

India's situation is less parlous than Europe's in 2010-11, but to expect the corporate sector to lead to a robust acceleration in growth belies common sense. India's corporate debt-to-GDP appears low in comparison to some other countries (chart 1), but this is misleading. Ideally, corporate debt should be scaled to the sector's output. This data is not easily available for all countries. However, I do have it for the US. Although US corporate debt to GDP ratio is nearly 1.5 times India's, the corporate sector's share of GDP in the United States is close to twice that in India. And, US corporate debt is near records highs historically. Moreover, recent report from Thomson Reuters bears out the struggles of the corporate sector with debt. Unfortunately, there is no long history of India's corporate debt but BIS does publish total private nonfinancial sector debt, which includes households and corporates. The second chart shows total private sector debt to GDP. Household debt is about 10% of GDP today, so most of the sharp rise in the last decade reflects the runup in corporate sector debt. Today's indigestion is payback for the exuberance of the 2000s.





Meanwhile, capacity utilization is still low. In fact, L&T CFO in a recent interview said that he does not see a private sector recovery for two more years. 




Tight Policy

Given India's faltering growth and weak capex, fiscal policy is simply too tight. In the past, when spending growth was as weak as it is now, the fiscal deficit was wider by about two percentage points of GDP, or about 3 lakh crores! I don't want to suggest that those policies were perfect and have to be emulated. Hardly. (India's policies have been often been procyclical--that is, the government has splurged when the going has been good instead of leaning against the wind. The second chart below shows government debt overlaid on private sector debt. You can see the tendency for both to rise together. Instead, the government should be playing a stabilizing role--cutting back deficits when the private economy is booming and supporting demand when the private sector is retrenching.)  However, in the present situation, with the private economy faltering and government debt near two-decade lows, a dose of fiscal boost is what the economy needs.


Not to be left behind, monetary policy is even more of a Scrooge. the spread between nominal GDP growth--which capture both inflation and real growth--and the RBI repo rate is near its lowest levels of the past 17 years, indicating that policy is tight. An easier monetary policy will spur household credit offtake--for consumer durables and housing. India's household debt is very low and household borrowing can help spur economic revival. Fiscal policy measures to support low-income housing combined with interest rate cuts can kill two birds with one stone.



Sunday, September 17, 2017

Flawed Uses of Mean Reversion in Markets

The use of mean-reversion is pervasive in economics and finance. Much of our use of statistical relationships--or for that matter any inductive inference based on past patterns--in economics and finance is essentially predicated on some loose form of mean-reversion. Yet, time series data also display structural breaks. The always thoughtful Philosophical Economics had a great post about the need for investors to update their beliefs. I am going to take a slightly different tack. Yes, investors need to constantly update their beliefs, but most the problems stem from flawed beliefs rather than changes in structural relationships.

Valuations

Consider CAPE. If I ran any econometric test for a structural break, they would all show that the CAPE series has a structural break sometime in the 1990s. In other words, it has been "different this time" for over two decades. When could you have known with a great degree of confidence that a break occurred? Certainly, by 2005--after all the decline in 2000-02 brought the CAPE barely below the 1960s peak! If you were still not convinced, running break tests in July 2009 would have confirmed it. So, those using CAPE alone as a measuring rod should certainly have been wary. 



We can run similar tests with the regular PE or other valuation metrics and the broad conclusions are not very different--sometime in the 1990s there is a structural break.

However, I would argue that the CAPE or the PE are poor candidates for mean reversion. That they seem to bounce around and exhibit some cyclicality does not mean there is a mean which they gravitate toward or there is any time frame in which they should. Theoretically, there is no upward limit to PE. More relevant, the PE is driven by discount factor and growth expectations. We really should be judging if PE adjusted for discount factor and growth expectations shows any structural break.

Consider the earnings yield over 10-year Treasury yield adjusted for inflation and growth (the Fed model corrected for its flaws). I have used NIPA earnings and equity market capitalization from the Flow of Funds. 



Visually, does this picture suggest any break to you? Contrast with the CAPE picture. Statistically too, the case for break in the 1990s is much less significant.

At the bottom of it, value guys want to believe that there is a bedrock relationship between earnings and valuations. And it appears that there was one for more than 300 years, according to this study. However, the study also suggests that the discount factor has become more dominant in the post WWII era. So, if it is different this time, that time started in 1945!

Profit Margins

There are a lot of misconceptions about profit margins. I would encourage you to read a longer piece I wrote with my colleagues at the Levy Forecasting Center. Briefly,

1. Often, people are looking at the wrong measure of margins--for instance, corporate profits as a share of GDP, when they should be looking at profits earned domestically as a share of GDP. the correct margin (the blue line below) is high but not off the charts.


2. Margins are bounded and cyclical but that does not mean they are mean-reverting. They can remain high for decades.

The bottom line is that mean-reversion based arguments are tricky. Use with caution. 

  Current Account Imbalances, Debt Buildup, and Instability Abstract: Orthodox trade theory focuses on the reallocation of real resources th...